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Collaborative Research and the Emotions of Overstatement: 
A Reply to Crow 
 
 
In a recent article in this journal (‘Collaborative Research and the Emotions of Overstatement’) Graham 
Crow argued that arguments for collaborative research were often overstated and sought to warn those 
who would adopt this position by offering ‘four cautionary tales’. These focused upon (i) paying insufficient 
attention to history, (ii) conflating ‘different’ with ‘better’, (iii) over-simplifying social complexity and (iv) 
courting conflict and were themselves loosely tied to an emotional construct concerning hope and 
disappointment, pride and shame. ‘A conversation between collaborative and other researchers about such 
issues’ Crow concludes ‘promises to be more constructive than hostilities, and is more in keeping with 
collaborative researchers’ commitment to dialogue’. This response accepts Crow’s entreaty to continue the 
conversation. First, it suggests that he (paradoxically) falls into the trap of his own making by overstating the 
extent to which collaborative scholars have sought to make the case for methodological supremacy in quite 
the manner he suggests. As such, the ‘four cautionary tales’ that Crow offers would not only be widely 
accepted as valid by the vast majority of collaborative scholars but are also of generic relevance across the 
full spectrum of social scientific methods. To seek to place such ‘tales’ so explicitly at the door of 
collaborative scholars is therefore arguably unfair or, at best, to make a curious case that remains largely 
unproven. Indeed, it is very difficult to read the piece without coming to the conclusion that Crow’s focus 
is less upon the sphere of collaborative research and methods per se and more about the work of a specific 
group of scholars and a specific research programme.  
 
Nevertheless, no matter how carefully constructed, strawmen (whether of the theoretical, empirical or 
common farmyard variety) are generally relatively easy to knock-down and having done this the second 
part of this response uses Crow’s article as a launch-pad to identify four far broader and more fundamental 
issues that concern the interplay between emotions and collaborative research. It achieves this by locating 
this relationship within the shifting contemporary context through a multi-level lens which arguably offers 
a far more sophisticated and vibrant account of not only the need for collaborative modes of research 
(conducted ‘with’ not ‘on’) but also of the changing emotional pressures facing social scientists who seek 
to exist at the nexus or interface between academe, society and social change. As such, the second part of 
this article offers ‘four cautionary tales’ of its own that are not only very different to those raised by Crow 




I. A CAUTIONARY TALE OF OVERSTATING  
 
The section evaluates Crow’s core thesis concerning collaborative research in order to construct a reference 
point from which to open-up a far broader conversation about the interplay between emotions and 
collaborative research in the second section. My argument is that in seeking to expose what are perceived 
to be the narrow and unrealistic expectations associated with collaborative research Crow unwittingly slips 
into a trap of his own making by overstating the nature, dominance and relevance of those claims. ‘Research 
methods and methodology is a well populated field in which proponents of an array of different approaches 
vie for the attention of researchers’ Crow correctly notes. As a political scientist I am more than a little 
aware of the existence of deep rivalries, tensions and the destructive capability of methodological schisms. 
Putting the same point slightly differently, political science has always been ‘a divided discipline’ with 
various sects existing in different schools and sitting at different tables, ‘each with its own conception of 
proper political science, but each protecting some secret island of vulnerability’ as Gabriel Almond 
famously noted in (1988, see also 1990).  This history of political science is a history of intense and ultimately 
futile contestation between ‘hard’ and ‘soft’, ‘quants’ versus ‘qual’, ‘objectivity’ against ‘ideology’, etc. 
Although more heterogeneous than is commonly recognised (see Eulau, 1963; 1968), the emergence of a 
behavioural movement led by scholars including David Easton (1953), David Truman (1955) and Robert 
Dahl (1961) in the middle of the twentieth century attacked the perceived backwardness of the discipline 
and was underpinned by the promotion of a very specific view of what ‘excellence in research’ looked like.  
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The ‘behavioural-turn’ was ‘[H]istorically speaking’ Robert Dahl acknowledged ‘was a protest movement 
within political science’ (1961, p.766) that claimed new and innovative set of methods had the potential to 
break new ground. But although proponents argued in favour of a paradigmatic shift in the nature of the 
discipline not everyone was convinced. Works including Bernard Crick’s The American Science of Politics (1959) 
sought to challenge many of the dominant assumptions that were too often veiled within exaggerated or 
exclusive claims for this new political science; an endeavour similarly undertaken in the same year, albeit 
with a more caustic intellectual tone and working across a more expansive disciplinary landscape, by C. 
Wright Mills’ in his The Sociological Imagination (1959).   
 
The subsequent disciplinary battles – whether the debates around ‘real-world’ or ‘post-autistic’ economics, 
the ‘public sociology wars’, or the ‘Perestroika movement’ in political science to mention just a few – have 
all revolved around the contestation of what constitutes credible ‘science’. Different sects and tribes have 
attempted to promote and protect the innate value of ‘their’ methodological idiom against the competing 
intellectual demands of those who would advocate a very different perspective; or argue in favour of 
diversity and pluralism, and as part of this may have attempted to turn ‘the methodological pyramid’ on its 
side. The internal politics of academic life is therefore very often dominated by methodological squabbles 
that involve a variety of claims and counter-claims which are essentially political disputes concerning the 
distribution of resources (such as funding, appointments, prizes but also including notions of esteem, 
prestige and credibility).  
 
This is not a new or particularly original argument.  But it does help contextualise Crow’s thesis concerning 
collaborative research. In essence, he suggests that collaborative researchers have adopted a somewhat 
triumphalist tone which seeks to highlight the distinctive benefits of inclusive and participatory methods 
while tacitly ‘othering’ all other approaches as by definition inferior. Exaggeration, hubris and the dangers 
of over-promising but under-supplying are linked by Crow (via. Becker, 1971) to the quasi-religious and 
emotionally-laden pathologies of ‘proselytising’, ‘preaching’, ‘self-righteous assurance’ and even ‘salvation’. 
Heaven help those social scientists who promote ‘one right way’ (Becker, 1986). The emotional dimension 
therefore operates at, at least, two levels. There is an epistemological dimension which revolves around 
issues of objectivity and bias, and which flows into questions concerning whether it is either possible or 
desirable to remove emotions or feelings, values or normative ideals from the research process (i.e. often 
signalled through the language of ‘science’ as opposed to ‘studies’). There is also a second related but also 
quite separate emotional dimension which is more professional in nature and simply highlights the 
emotional investment that many scholars inevitably invest in their research (i.e. the emotional labour involved 
in research practice). This is a rarely acknowledged dimension which may add tone and texture to Crow’s 
arguments. The point I am trying to make is that the emotional investment made by a scholar in a specific 
approach can lead to a situation whereby ‘to attack the method is to attack the scholar which is to attack the 
individual’;’ or (conversely) to promote ‘your method’ or approach is to directly or indirectly do ‘our approach’ 
or method down. This muddying of the waters between what might be termed ‘the personal and the 
methodological’ can often make it difficult to separate legitimate ontological, epistemological or technical 
questions or concerns from more dubious ad hominem critiques.  
 
Such emotive hermeneutic questions are clearly problematic but they matter because Crow arguably fails 
to offer a critique of collaborative research per se but instead focuses almost exclusively on a very specific 
sub-strand of this broad field of scholarship, and one that I would suggest is quite exceptional (for a review 
of the breadth of the field see Olson and Jason, 2015). Even the most cursory review of the references used 
to identify Crow’s methodological miscreants highlights the way in which he reads ‘collaborative research’ 
as for some reason almost synonymous with the work of Keri Facer, George McKay and Kate Pahl (Facer 
and Pahl, 2017; Facer and McKay, 2019; Facer and Enright, 2019; Pahl and Ward, 2017). As such, the 
narrowness of the reference profile suggests that Crow’s critique is not really with ‘collaborative research’ 
in the broad and mainstream sense of the term (discussed below) but of the research emanating from the 
‘Connected Communities’ research programme which ran in the UK from 2014-2019. Led by the Arts and 
Humanities Research Council but co-funded by a range of organisations this project sought to understand 
the changing nature of communities in their contexts, and the role of communities in sustaining and 
enhancing the quality of life. As the Director of Research at the AHRC underlined at the time, the 
programme was designed to be unique in terms of testing innovations in the co-design of research and 
closing the traditional distance between academic research and community engagement (AHRC, 2014). It 
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also had social as well as scholarly ambitions which, in turn, reflected the co-funded nature of the 
programme and were reflected in its core aim:   
 
To mobilise the potential for increasingly inter-connected, culturally diverse, communities to enhance 
participation, prosperity, sustainability, health & well-being by better connecting research, 
stakeholders and communities. 
 
Mobilising communities and enhancing participation are explicitly political ambitions and there will always 
be risks ‘associated with engendering expectations that new solutions to old problems may be in prospect’ 
as Crow suggests. However, this was intended to be uniquely risky research of a very specific manner (i.e. 
embedded, immersive, participatory action-research) which Facer and Pahl underlined was not offered as 
providing ‘one new truth, one new method, to replace all others’ (Facer and Pahl, 2017, 1-3). It therefore 
seems somewhat odd to locate this body of work at the core of a thesis regarding ‘the emotions of over-
statement’ and leaves Crow suggesting rather tenuously that,  
 
[T]hey do nevertheless tend to imply that collaborative research is better than those alternative 
approaches which by contrast have been critiqued variously as exclusionary, unaccountable, 
exploitative, unethical, invalid, unreliable, unimaginative, unproductive and lacking significance 
[emphasis added]. 
 
‘Guilt by implication’ is always a tricky charge to uphold but there is little doubt that Kate Pahl and other 
members of the ‘Connected Communities’ team were willing to make a very personal and undoubtedly 
emotional investment in the quality and ambitions of their work which, in turn, leads to the selection of 
methodologies which from a mainstream perspective might appear as unbounded as they do messy. In this 
regard they do reject the ideology of the rational, detached and objective researcher’ (Loughran and Mannay, 
2018a). However, in the twenty-first century my sense is that the vast majority of social scientists also reject 
this ideology in its purest form for the simple reason that the entanglements of emotions can never be 
denied. What Facer, Pahl and others have arguably decided to do is to expose and engage with those 
emotional entanglements as a central feature of their research. Instead of seeking to depoliticize their research 
through a faux attempt to deny the existence of underpinning values and emotions they seek to explicitly 
politicise their scholarship in terms of process, affect and outcomes. Once again, the history of political 
science provides a useful vantage point. In the United States the dominance of behaviourism in the 1950s 
and 1960s led to widespread concerns not just about its claimed emotional objectivity and its perceived 
hegemony within the discipline but also about the manner in which it demanded that a clear separation 
should be maintained between political science, on the one hand, and political activism, on the other. The 
creation of the Caucus for a New Political Science in 1967 challenged this stance and encouraged 
methodological pluralism and political activism within the discipline (see Barrow, 2008). Social science 
without some form of progressive social ambition was not an attractive prospect for many scholars and the 
official mission of the Caucus was ‘to make the study of politics relevant to the struggle for a better world’ 
and in many ways the more recent ‘Perestroika movement’ was simply the latest instalment of the ongoing 
ebb-and-flow in the battle about the most scientifically credible and socially valuable way of studying socio-
political phenomena (Renwick Monroe, 2005). The notion of ‘ebb-and-flow’ brings us back to Crow’s focus 
on overstatement (and therefore understatement) and his ‘four cautionary tales’.  
 
 
Tale 1:  The Danger of Paying Insufficient Attention to History 
 
Can there be any credible social scientists that would disagree with the simple adage that ‘history matters’?  
The suggestion that any scholar or research project needs to be warned about ‘the risks of amnesia’ – 
especially when working in an embedded community context – is tantamount to an accusation that lies 
somewhere between amateurism and incompetence.  The fact that Ray Pahl’s (1984) scholarship is explicitly 
discussed as an exemplar of someone who understood how history casts a shadow over communities adds 
a strange emotional twist to the critique. This is because Crow proceeds to highlight the ‘Connected 
Communities’ programme, in which Kate Pahl (i.e. Ray’s daughter) was a leading figure, almost as an 
exemplar of a project that ‘exaggerated claims to novelty’ to the detriment historical awareness. Claims that 
this programme played a role in ‘creating a new knowledge landscape’ or that it developed a capacity ‘to 
build new knowledge, addressing silences and exclusions, and pluralise the forms of knowledge used to 
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inform common-sense understandings of the world’ (Facer and McKay, 2019, xii) is critiqued on the basis 
that the claims of collaborative or participatory methods being ‘new’ (or ‘better’) than ‘older’ (or more 
‘established’) approaches is contestable. ‘[C]laims to novelty may turn out to be harder to sustain once 
history is explored in more detail’ Crow suggests ‘and supposedly new methods and methodologies turn 
out to have had a longer period in which to prove themselves (and possibly to reveal that they may also 
have limitations in at least some of the research contexts).’   
 
There are, however, both internal and external dimensions to how any social research project might seek 
to engage with historical factors. What might be termed the external dimension refers to the degree to which 
any study seeks to locate itself within an appreciation of the broader and longstanding seam of scholarship 
of which it now forms an element; the internal dimension, by contrast, revolves around the degree to which 
the basic aims and ambitions of a project are themselves concerned with facilitating a deeper understanding 
of why history matters. It would therefore be possible for a world-class collaborative project to excel in 
relation to the internal dimension without necessarily or explicitly spending a huge amount of time seeking 
to wrap itself in a cloak of credibility through endless references to previous studies. Take, for example, 
Cathrine Thorleifsson’s (2016) ethnographic work in the South Yorkshire town of Doncaster and the 
manner in which it revealed why the history of a former railway town in a coal mining region mattered. It 
mattered because a populist party, in this case UKIP, was able to tap into the town’s ‘deep story’ by 
promising to reinvest in the extractive industries. The emotional links between history, hope and nostalgia 
were revealed through the stories local people told but the quality and relevance of this research was not 
affected by its failure to acknowledge the collected works of previous generations of ethnographers. As 
Sara Ahmed (2017) has argued, to construct an argument through the citations of previous scholars also 
risks seriously delimiting the boundaries of any discussion, which in turn, suggests that when it comes to 
learning from the past through a scholarly lens there is also a danger of paying too much attention to history.  
 
With this in mind it becomes necessary to assess the degree to which a detailed review of both the internal 
and external dimensions of the ‘Connected Communities’ programme actually validates Crow’s implied 
critique concerning ‘historical amnesia’. From an internal perspective the critique seems weak for the simple 
reason that a large number of projects within this programme were explicitly concerned with revealing and 
understanding why history matters by utilising participatory tools and collaborative methods to allow 
specific and generally hidden communities to find their voice. In this sense a core objective of the 
programme was to ensure that sufficient attention was paid to the historical narratives and interpretations 
held by different sections of society (in order ‘to uncover knowledge and imagine better futures’) (see, for 
example, Graham and Vergunst, 2019; Campbell, Pahl, Pente and Rasool, 2018). The omission by Crow 
of any apparent awareness of the leading role played by the noted historian Paul Ward in the programme 
– with analyses entitled ‘How can historical knowledge help us to make sense of communities like 
Rotherham (2018, with Elizabeth Pente) – is a major oversight. From an external perspective it is also true 
that the books arising out of the programme are generally more engaged with the intellectual heritage vis-à-
vis collaborative research and ‘do not lose sight of what has gone before’ in quite the way that Crow 
suggests. The projects that Sarah Banks led, for example, within the ‘Connected Communities’ programme 
revolved around revisiting the Community Development projects of the 1970s (see Banks, Hart, Pahl and 
Ward, 2018). It’s also possible to suggest that the claims to novelty and newness that were actually being 
made by the ‘Connected Communities’ programme were not in fact about collaborative research or community 
engagement being new but were actually more concerned with the cultivation of new participatory methods or 
tools, with that research being conducted within a social context that was to some extent inevitably ‘new’ 
and, as such, potentially created ‘new’ opportunities. To link this programme with the danger of failing to 
pay sufficient attention to history is therefore possibly something of an over-statement. Which brings the 
discussion to the second cautionary tale.  
 
 
Tale 2:  The Danger of Conflating ‘Different’ with ‘Better’  
 
The British sociologist Michael Young, later Lord Young of Dartington, was an exceptional person. A great 
believer in social reform, he was responsible for drafting the Labour Party’s manifesto for the 1945 General 
Election and he went on to found or help establish a number of organisations - including the Open 
University, the Consumer’s Association, the National Extension College, the Citizens Advice Bureau 
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network, the Open College of Arts, Language Line, the Social Science Research Council, and the University 
of the Third Age – which all shared a focus on social inclusion, active citizenship and community 
participation. In 1953 Young established the Institute for Community Studies (ICS) in the East London 
district of Bethnal Green with the stated purpose of examining the interaction of the family, the community 
and the social services. As such, the ICS sought to understand how ordinary men and women were 
interacting with the new expanded social service sector and whether the tentacles of the state operating in 
cooperation or conflict with established patterns of family support and mutual aid? In 1957 Young 
published Family and Kinship in East London (co-authored with Peter Wilmott) which engaged with this 
question through a focus on the transfer of large working class communities from the East End to a new 
housing estate in Essex called Debden. They suggested that extended family ties and kinship networks 
provided an essential support structure for the residents of the East End and that those who had moved 
away were more likely to experience a decline in their quality of life due to elements of social and cultural 
isolation. Long before the concept became popular Young and Wilmott had essentially focused attention 
on the significance of social capital. Dense networks of mutual support, rooted in the notion of the family 
and the neighbourhood provided individuals with a sense of shared identity and sources of practical day-
to-day support, Young and Wilmott argued, that tended to be lost as individuals and families were 
‘uprooted’ and moved to Essex.  
 
The reason for offering this brief account of Michael Young and the work of the ICS in the 1950s is because 
it provides something of a link or bridge between Crow’s first ‘cautionary tale’ about not forgetting the past 
and his second warning that ‘different’ is not always ‘better’. More importantly, however, it also provides a 
powerful example of not forgetting the past and why ‘doing research differently’ may, from some 
perspectives, equate with ‘doing it better’.  
 
The ‘different’ element of Family and Kinship in East London was the manner in which it was rooted in a 
critique of the dominant methods of social research at the time. This is a book that has been acknowledged 
as one of the most influential sociological studies of the twentieth century and a large part of that intellectual 
heritage is based upon its use of deep, immersive, ethnographic and participatory methods. These methods 
were in stark contrast to the highly statistical and ‘scientific’ approaches that were dominant in the 1950s 
(and which were themselves linked to the availability of new mass social data sets and technological 
advances). The raison d'être of the ICS was that it undertook social research ‘with’ local communities not ‘on’ 
local communities and through this developed a deep understanding of the aspirations, worries, doubts and 
insecurities held be different people, families and communities. It was therefore both an intellectual and 
political project but its methodological originality rested on the use of collaborative research methods and 
participatory techniques. In this regard it might be relevant to Crow’s thesis that none of the ICS’s initial 
researchers (i.e. Michael Young, Peter Wilmott, Peter Townsend) were at the time the Institute was 
established experienced academics. They were ‘outsiders’ or as Lise Butler suggests ‘a collection of amateurs 
with cavalier attitudes towards academic sociology’ (2015, 213). Nevertheless, the work of the ICS was 
‘different’ in the sense that it worked beyond the social scientific mainstream at the time, and it offered 
what might be described as a ‘better’ account of the politics of kinship due to the manner in which it 
exposed the emotional foundations of working class life and their day-to-day manifestation in the existence and 
role of extended families. It was for this reason that the Family and Kinship in East London was republished 
fourteen times between 1961 and 1980 and has influenced several generations of town planners, sociologists 
and social historians.  
 
This ‘historical’ element arises from the fact that in 2019 a new Institute for Community Studies was 
established by the Young Foundation to ‘bridge the chasm between the voices of people and those in 
power. To shift the rhetoric of listening towards genuine forms of engaging and co-creating; and to bring 
the sharp insights and knowledge from communities in to where they can be heard in their own words, in 
robust and real ways.’ Crow may well remind those that promote the ‘new’ ICS that these stated ambitions 
echo those that were set out 65 years ago and that this history should not be forgotten. Nevertheless, 
acknowledging the past need not limit bold ambitions for the future. The institute seeks to ‘build on the 
long track record of deep insights and detail-driven research with communities started by Michael Young 
in the 1950s’. Yet there is a clear sense within the institute’s ambitions of the need for doing things 
differently. ‘Our mission is to build bridges between communities and institutions’ its website states ‘finding 
new ways in which academics and communities can work together, and by doing so, bring together very 
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different kinds of knowledge [emphasis added]’. The new ICS is arguably one of the most significant long-term 
investments in research infrastructure around collaborative methods and social change to occur in the UK 
for several decades but plans and statements lack the triumphalist and exaggerated tones that Crow seeks 
to link collaborative endeavours.  
 
In this regard Crow seeks to draw upon Norbert Elias and John Scotson’s classic community study The 
Established and the Outsiders (1965, p.159) by suggesting that collaborative scholars constantly self-define as 
‘the minority of the best’ while defining all other approaches through a focus on ‘the minority of the worst’. 
This is a fascinating argument but its strength is to some extent weakened by Crow’s own admission that 
the ‘[methodologically] pluralist viewpoint does have exponents in the field of collaborative research’. The 
specific studies he cites in support of his argument are also underwhelming and lead him to make the rather 
unconvincing claim that ‘Many further examples could be cited, and the more that such cases accumulate, 
the greater the potential exists for the implication to be drawn that doing research differently equates to doing research 
better [emphasis added]’. As already argued, ‘guilt by implication’ is never a firm foundation on which to 
launch a rather strong intellectual and professional critique in the manner Crow seeks to promote. Without 
the great weight of these ‘further examples’ being provided the reader is arguably left with the distinct 
feeling that it is actually Crow who may be exaggerating the case that ‘different is better’ rather than the 
collaborative scholars to whom he seeks to make the accusation stick. My strong sense is that the vast 
majority of collaborative research is located within an epistemological argument that ‘different is different’ 
rather than ‘different is better’. Take, for example, the ICS’ Looking Local report of November 2019 and the 
manner in which researchers working with local communities through ‘deep’ participatory and discursive 
methods revealed a very different set of key social concerns to those that national polling companies were 
producing through ‘thin’ survey methods.  
 
Crow’s argument that although non-collaborative methods are not perfect ‘it does not follow that only 
collaborative research is worth undertaking, remembering and building on’ appears to be an argument that 
any credible social scientist would accept (and collaborative scholars would also gladly concede that their 
methods are far from perfect). There are two other slightly odd elements to Crow’s thesis. The first is that 
he highlights the work of Ray Pahl in Sheppey (1978) and Zanib Rasool in Rotherham (2018) as existing 
within the ‘minority of the best’ of non-collaborative research which is odd as both studies utilise 
collaborative approaches and participatory tools. The former was traditional old-fashioned deep 
ethnography that involved Pahl living on the largely boggy and barren Isle of Sheppey off the Kent coast; 
Rasool’s work could hardly have been more collaborative given that it involved working with a poet and 
groups of local people. The second odd element of Crow’s argument is that despite the fact that Rasool’s 
work was part of the broader ‘Connected Communities’ programme Crow returns to a critique of this 
initiative and to a very specific comment by Keri Facer and Kate Pahl (2017) that working collaboratively 
‘creates better research outcomes’. On its own this simple four-word statement would seem to place Facer 
and Pahl very much within the sphere of over-statement and possibly even methodological supremacy that 
Crow seeks to critique. The full sentence in which these four words appear, however, is more a statement 
of fact than over-statement or hyperbole: ‘Universities are increasingly being asked to take an active role as 
research collaborators with citizens, public bodies and community organisations which, it is claimed, makes 
them more accountable, creates better research outcomes and enhances the knowledge base [emphasis added].’ 
Facer and Pahl are in this sentence contextualising a debate about valuing inter-disciplinary collaborative 
research and in doing so are highlighting the increasing emphasis that research funders are placing on modes 
of co-production and co-design with potential research users. The manner in which they insert the phrase 
‘it is claimed’ into this statement before listing the rationale on which this shift has undoubtedly been based 
hardly seems to fit with concerns regarding over-statement. Facer and Pahl are not themselves claiming 
anything but stating what has been claimed by others; Crow, on the other hand, risks offering a simplified 




Tale 3:  The Danger of Advancing Simplified Accounts of Complex Issues 
 
‘The moral of the previous section’ Crow states ‘is that in the comparison of alternative approaches to 
research, collaborative and other, it is easier to distinguish the different ways of working than it is to 
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demonstrate the inherent superiority of one over another’. There is very little on which to question this 
statement for the simple reason that very few scholars would want to throw themselves into the 
methodological maelstrom that would come with seeking to demonstrate ‘the inherent superiority of one 
over another’, (as noted above, ‘different is different, different is not better’.) Crow (correctly) notes that 
outputs from different approaches can be aimed at very specific audiences and that questions concerning 
how appropriate it is to adopt a critical stance, and how much authors should aim for accessibility and 
relevance ‘remain contentious’. It is also true that approaches to scholarship that exist beyond the 
mainstream may well struggle in finding value in other’s tradition of knowledge production. Although this 
is the specific focus of Facer and Pahl’s (2019) Valuing Inter-Disciplinary Collaborative Research, Crow 
immediately focuses his critique on the work of Facer and Enright (2016, 126) and their comment about 
the publication of academic articles as ‘another step on the treadmill of banal academic over-production’ 
before placing this in the context of other outputs from the ‘Connected Communities’ programme 
(specifically Pahl and Ward, 2017).  
 
The slightly curious element of Crow’s article is that he then proceeds to highlight that research outputs 
with immediate practical application may be valued more by community partners, just as more academic 
outputs are likely to be more valued by scholars; just as distinction may be drawn between research that is 
‘for research participants’ and research that is ‘on research participants’; or as Facer and Pahl (2017, 15) have 
previously acknowledged between “‘learning with’ rather than doing things ‘on’ people”. Highlighting these 
valid and well-known distinctions is not in itself distinctive but Crow’s subsequent statement that “these 
distinctions have the potential to be re-cast as a debate about taking sides, famously framed as the 
deceptively-simple question asked of researchers, ‘Whose side are you on?’ (Becker, 1967).” Why does Crow 
need to highlight the potential of fairly conventional methodological distinctions to be ‘re-cast as a debate 
about taking sides?’ Having written extensively on issues including ‘the tyranny of impact’ (see, for example, 
Flinders, 2013a), the politics of engaged scholarship (see, for example, Flinders 2013b) the moral 
foundations of public engagement (see, for example, Flinders 2019), ‘the politics of co-production’ (see, 
for example, Flinders, Wood and Cunningham, 2015) and most recently on the emotional underpinnings 
of the growth of populism (see, for example, Flinders , 2019) By adopting this ‘whose side are you on?’ 
approach it is Crow that is in danger of advancing a simplified account of a complex issue. Social and 
political scientists must learn the skills, or as C. Wright Mills (1959) might say ‘the craft’, of navigating a 
series of often blurred, over-lapping and shifting socio-political boundaries. ‘The ethics of such issues’ are 
as Crow notes ‘complicated’ but the cautionary tale he offers to collaborative scholars regarding the need 
to keep emotions in check or that ‘it remains prudent to ask of these would-be [community] representatives 
who the ‘we’ is that they are seeking to represent’ seems as banal as it is obvious.  
 
If, at base, Crow’s article represents a critique of collaborative scholarship on the basis that it too often 
advances simplified accounts of complex issues then what it lacks is a clear and credible evidence base to 
support this argument. In fact, two issues appear highly problematic; the first from an intellectual 
perspective, the second from a professional perspective. The first issue is that each of Crow’s cautionary 
tales seeks to impose a fairly simple binary dynamic which generally fails when stress-tested against either 
the existing research base or the simple complexity of the social phenomena under analysis. Sufficient or 
insufficient attention is paid to history, it’s different or better, simplicity or complexity, insiders or outsiders, 
‘minority of the worst’ or ‘minority of the best’; all generally viewed in oppositional terms and as 
representing mono-dimensional zero-sum games that offer very little in terms of developing the analytical 
traction of each of these lenses. The irony, as has already been stated, is that this in itself represents an 
example of both over-statement alongside the advancement of a simplified account of a set of complex 
issues which is exactly the critique that Crow seeks to lay at the door of collaborative researchers. In many 
ways he does not seek to critique the full sphere of collaborative scholarship but a very specific sub-set of 
scholars that played a role in an explicitly innovative, risky and socially-orientated programme of work that 
was always intended to exist at the nexus or intersection between academe and society. Exactly why the 
‘Connected Communities’ programme provides the lightning-rod for so much attempted critique is never 
really clear; to the extent that there is a sense that an unspoken emotional undercurrent lurks beneath the 
surface of the text. For example, Crow mentions Facer and Enright’s (2016, 126) comment about ‘the 
treadmill of academic over-production’ but not the fact that given the pressures of the UK’s Research 
Excellence Framework similar comments have been made by scholars from a vast range of disciplines and 
methodological standpoints (see, for example, Sayer 2015). By forging a very broad and not unproblematic 
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critique and then consistently relating it to one specific piece of research Crow appears almost captured by 
a desire to ‘court conflict’. A point that brings us neatly (but ironically) to his final cautionary tale. 
 
 
Tale 4:  The Danger of Courting Conflict  
 
‘At this point’ Crow notes as he introduces his fourth and final cautionary tale ‘an interim conclusion may 
be drawn that there are dangers in exaggeration’. This is a conclusion that the vast majority of readers of 
his article are by this point likely to have already come to, but possibly not in quite the way Crow predicts. 
Once again and somewhat working against the tide of his own argument Crow proceeds to underline that 
a significant number of scholars who work within a broadly collaborative idiom have been very open and 
explicit about the risks that such approaches inevitably bring with them. These include ethical concerns, 
the risk of harm to communities or individuals, the creation of unrealistic expectations, the existence of 
power imbalances, the need to constantly (re)negotiate relationships, the possibility of conflict over  
timescales, processes or outputs, the potential for competing agendas to come into tension, and even the 
creation of almost parasitical co-dependency relationships that can, on occasion, become pathological to 
all parties (citing Salway, 2011; O’Neill, 2012; Nind, 2014; Hacker, 2013; Robson, 2002). What Crow’s 
review suggests is the existence of a range of balanced accounts that highlight the benefits alongside the 
challenges of collaborative research undertaken with the community through participatory methods. No 
one is suggesting that collaborative research offers a panacea to the challenges of contemporary social or 
political analysis which leads Crow to draw-upon McLennan (1995) and state ‘a degree of humility is in 
order about one’s own way of knowing relative to others that are available’. A cautionary tale no doubt but 
hardly a new or distinctive revelation.  
 
The sting in the tale, however, emerges when Crow suggests that not all scholars have shown the required 
degree of humility. Trumpets have been blown, bold statements have been made and some scholars have 
dared to make the case for collaborative research within far broader debates concerning (inter alia) the social 
role of scholarship, the marketization and commodification of academe and the essential necessity of 
creative thinking, questioning and criticality within higher education. The fact that all three of these issues 
form central components of what C. Wright Mills sought to both capture and promote in his notion of ‘the 
sociological imagination’ deserves to be recognised. With apparent affront, Crow notes that ‘[n]ot all cases 
made for collaborative research adopt this pluralist position’ and he returns to a (by now common) target 
when seeking to set this particular hook. “For example, one recent contribution to the debate’ he notes 
‘advanced the view that ‘We should fight for academia as a space in which to co-produce’” as he once again 
focuses the critique upon the ‘Connected Communities’ programme and again on Kate Pahl (2018, with 
David Bell). Crow notes,  
 
The supporting argument is full of echoes of the paradigm wars that were fought between advocates of 
positions characterised more by hubris than humility, both in tone (‘against’, ‘hostile’, ‘attack’, ‘parasitical’) 
and content (the need to ‘challenge established ways of doing things’, including pursuing ‘challenges to 
academic modes of knowledge dissemination’, the need to address ‘the demands of (overly-) research (ed) 
subjects’, and to ‘avoid working with groups who will not “rock the boat”’).  
 
Crow’s interpretation of Pahl and Bell’s arguments lead him to suggest that they are not just in danger of 
courting conflict but of possibly even sparking a new set of ‘paradigm wars’. The rationale for this is that a 
key characteristic of these ‘wars’ was the ‘intolerance, indeed bigotry, towards styles of research which do 
not accord with their own view of proper procedure’ (Crow citing Bulmer, 1977, x). The implicit implication 
appears to be that ‘courting conflict’ is for some reason a ‘bad thing’ which somehow appears almost as 
quaint as it is naïve when assessed against the real-world grinding and grating, struggles and skirmishes that 
define intellectual debate and indeed progress. To seek to associate a specific piece of scholarship with 
allusions of ‘intolerance’ and ‘bigotry’ is a far more serious statement to make, and possibly a major over-
statement that brings with it a danger of creating unnecessary conflict. The problem for Crow is that his 
presentation and interpretation of Pahl and Bell’s specific 2018 article which he uses as the hook on which 
to hang his argument could in itself provide the basis of its own ‘cautionary tale’. This is because, in essence, 
Crow decontextualizes Pahl and Bell’s arguments in a way that leaves them devoid of tone and texture and 
therefore susceptible to what could be seen as a slightly unfair critique. More specifically, Crow seeks to 
 9 
locate the combative style and language of Pahl and Bell’s as symptomatic of previous ‘paradigm wars’ 
without at the same time acknowledging that their arguments were, in fact, based within an explicitly radical 
and utopian account of co-production that offered a highly distinctive interpretation of change to the extent 
that it is positioned “‘within, against and beyond current configurations of power in academia and society 
more broadly’” (2018, 105).  
 
Nevertheless, even within this fundamental assessment of modes of co-production there remains a clear 
sense of balance, ‘[o]ur focus is primarily on the potential (and dangers) of co-production’s utopian power to 
transform academia [emphasis added] (2018, 105).’ The style of the specific piece Crow cites to support his 
position is explicitly and intentionally agonistic, as befits a provocative analysis from a utopian perspective.  
The boldness of the arguments and the combative style of writing is therefore unsurprising in a piece that 
seeks to explore the potential of co-production to ‘destabilize’ both academia and capitalism. What is 
interesting given Crow’s purported focus on the link between collaborative research and the emotions of 
overstatement is that Pahl and Bell’s work draws-upon Ernst Bloch’s The Principle of Hope (1986) in order to 
tease-apart the relationships between a variety of emotions in the context of co-production. The omission 
of any mention of the existence or value of such insights is an odd oversight from Crow’s article but it 
should not be used to distract attention from two more fundamental shortcomings. The first is that Crow 
offers no real explanation for why collaborative scholars should avoid ‘courting conflict’. Intellectual and 
social progress is dependent upon the existence of debate, argument and contestation; and even though 
collaborative scholars may seek to broaden the main currency within academe away from a focus on peer-
reviewed publications they do not deny the existence of a middle-ground that adopts a more varied 
approach to ‘what counts’ as valid research outputs. Following on from this, the second shortcoming 
focuses on the lack of evidence that Crow is able to coral around the arguments he appears so committed 
to making. Pahl and Bell’s 2018 article cannot sensibly be presented as the basis of an argument that seeks 
to suggest that such radical approaches are at all common within the field of collaborative scholarship, in 
general, or within Kate Pahl’s extensive body of writing, in particular. This is not to deny the passion with 
which some scholars advocate the use of collaborative methods but simply to temper Crow’s position and 
suggest that his own position appears somewhat infused with the emotions of over-statement.  
 
 
II. A CAUTIONARY TALE OF UNDERSTATING  
 
There is no doubt that Crow’s ‘four cautionary tales’ offer significant insight and guidance to all social and 
political scientists. What is, however, missing is any clear rationale for why he feels these warnings are 
particularly appropriate for those who favour collaborative approaches and participatory methods. The 
clear and demonstrable evidence base for this core argument is simply not provided and, as such, the 
evidence base that collaborative scholars have been more wayward in terms of paying insufficient attention 
to history, conflating ‘different’ with ‘better’, over-simplifying complex issues or courting conflict is weak. 
Why then make an argument about the potential emergence of ‘paradigm wars’ and ‘sectarian 
methodological fights’? With this in mind one of the most curious elements of Crow’s proposition is its 
constant focus on one specific programme of research and a small group of scholars rather than upon 
collaborative research per se. Even in relation to this very specific body of work the charges with regard to 
historical awareness, methodological supremacy and over-simplifying complexity are not really supported 
by a detailed and rounded review of the work. If there is a cautionary tale of over-statement to be heeded, 
then it is possibly one unwittingly provided by Crow’s article rather than in the wider body of collaborative 
research. The reasons for this are unclear, especially in a piece that warns against ‘courting conflict’, but my 
sense was that the article was itself driven and defined by a powerful emotional dynamic that is never quite 
allowed to surface.  
 
This notion of surfacing emotional under-currents matters because it is possible to argue that the link 
between collaborative research and emotions has never been more important. This is a bold point to make. 
It is also one that resonates with many of the themes regarding social shifts and academic antagonisms that 
Crow raises within his work. But whereas he over-states a number of issues concerning the link between 
collaborative research and emotions this section seeks to continue and broaden the conversation by (very 
briefly) offering four very different ‘cautionary tales’ about issues that are general under-stated within and 
beyond academe but actually demand far more attention. In doing so it offers a multi-levelled analysis that 
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draws-upon Pahl and Bell’s (2018) positioning of ‘within, against, and beyond’ as a useful heuristic but adds a 




Tale 1:  The Danger Beyond: Fearful Societies and Emotional Intelligence 
 
If the work of the ‘Connected Communities’ programme provides the recurring focus of Crow’s case, then 
the work of C. Wright Mills appears to provide the intellectual touchstone for this response. The central 
element of which is Mills’ focus on what he termed ‘the promise’ and ‘the trap’ in his (in)famous work The 
Sociological Imagination (1959).  ‘Nowadays men often feel that their private lives are a series of traps’ Mills 
noted in the opening line ‘[t]hey sense that within their everyday worlds, they cannot overcome their 
troubles, and in this feeling, they are often quite correct…In what period have so many men been so totally 
exposed at so fast a pace to such earthquakes of change?’ What Mills’ labelled ‘the trap’ was therefore the 
risk that social change was outpacing the public’s capacity to make sense of the world; ‘the promise’, by 
contrast, related to the capacity of the social sciences to promote public understanding and to help 
individuals and communities understand their position in society and through this to assume some sense 
of control (i.e. to free them from the trap). The role of the scholar was, through this interpretation, 
concerned with far more than the accumulation of knowledge but in helping individuals make sense of the 
changing world and their capacity for action within it. 
 
Mills was a large, brusque, Texan cowboy – a ‘radical nomad’ (Hayden, 2006; see also Horowitz, 1983). He 
believed in ‘taking it big’ (Aronowitz, 2012) and was certainly not afraid of ‘courting conflict’ in the manner 
Crow suggests should be avoided. And yet Mills was acutely aware of not only the changing emotional 
landscape within American society but also the changing nature of academe.  ‘The very shaping of history 
now outpaces the ability of men to orientate themselves in accordance with cherished values. And which 
values? Even when they do not panic, men often sense that older ways of feeling and thinking have collapsed and 
that newer beginnings are ambiguous to the point of moral stasis (1959 [2000], p.4)[emphasis added]’. It is 
not difficult to take from Mills’ focus on ‘the misery of vague uneasiness’ and to recognise its direct 
contemporary resonance in debates concerning ‘the cultural backlash’ (Norris and Inglehart, 2019), ‘the left 
behind’ (Wuthnow, 2018) or ‘le peripherique’ (Guilluy, 2019)? To be trapped is therefore to feel confused, 
fearful, anxious and adrift.  
 
The core point being made, however, is that - notwithstanding the work of scholars including Sara Ahmed, 
Ernst Bloch, Martha Nussbaum, Raia Provhovnik, Paul Hoggett and Emma Hutchinson - the role of 
emotions and particularly why feelings matter and how they affect political attitudes and political behaviour in 
a context defined by the emergence of anti-political sentiment and populism remains under-studied, under-
acknowledged and ultimately under-stated. This case has been powerfully made by Laura Jenkins (2018) but 
the link back into Crow’s thesis about collaborative scholarship, and particularly the debate concerning 
‘different is different’ as opposed to ‘different is better’, is that an argument can be made that collaborative 
approaches provide specific value in terms of identifying and understanding the emotional dynamics of 
communities. As the 2016 (p.64) Casey Review into social fragmentation argued in its critique of much of 
the existing social science research base, ‘specific’ in the sense of being better able to ‘capture the mood of 
communities’ than more top-down quantitative or survey-based methodologies. Hochschild’s (2016) 
research with (not on) is mentioned by Crow and arguably provides a powerful example of the capacity of 
collaborative approaches to facilitate a deeper understanding of why emotions matter and how they might 
be understood. The great value offered by Hochschild’s analysis of what she terms an ‘empathy wall’, the 
‘great paradox’ and the existence of a ‘deep story’ is that it focuses attention on the significance of historical 
and arguably emotional anchorage. The potential links with Zygmunt Bauman’s work on ‘liquid modernity’ 
are obvious but the temptation to engage with them must be resisted in order to make two simple points: 
first, this mode of research is different and generally understood as such; and secondly, the links between 
collaborative research, emotions and social change go far wider than Crow’s ‘cautionary tales’ seem able to 
acknowledge. These leads us to consider a second challenge that has generally been under-stated: the 




Tale 2:  The Danger of Going Against: The Emotions of the Expectations Trap 
 
One of the most interesting and yet under-developed elements of Crow’s article is the manner in which it 
focuses attention on what might be termed ‘the politics and management of expectations’. History therefore 
provides examples of over-promising and under-supplying that might prevent the raising of unrealistic 
expectations in the future (i.e. Crow #1). Understanding that ‘different’ is not necessarily ‘better’ serves to 
dampen one’s claims (i.e. Crow #2); whereas advancing over-simplified accounts of complex issues (i.e. 
Crow #3) is also likely to underplay the probability that different actors may have very different priorities 
and expectations about the aims and ambitions research. There is little doubt that the challenge of managing 
various research-related expectations is an issue that has not received a significant amount of attention. It 
remains under-stated. I cannot help but wonder if when dealing with this topic Crow places too much 
emphasis on supply-side variables and too little emphasis on demand-side variables. Take, for a moment, the 
example of a politician who seeks to secure elected office. To some extent he or she is trapped within a 
professional framework that requires them to exaggerate and inflate the public’s expectations in order to 
secure office. On occasion, the pressures of party competition can lead to a situation where the public’s 
expectations are raised to such an extent that failure becomes to some extent inevitable (see Flinders 2012). 
The politician who considers adopting a very different strategy of under-promising and then over-supplying 
is also ‘destined to disappoint’ (Stoker, 2006) for the simple reason that they are highly unlikely to be elected 
in the first place. The danger of paying insufficient attention to the issue of expectations therefore has 
practical and emotional components. From a practical perspective, politicians who want to secure office 
have little choice but to ‘play the game’; and beyond this, part of the emotional essence of politics revolves 
around its capacity to inspire hope, belief and passion (i.e. ‘Yes we can!).  
 
It would at this point be possible to engage with Arlie Russell Hochschild’s The Managed Heart (2003) and 
her suggestion that by reducing our expectations we may protect ourselves from later disappointment but 
the main point this sub-section seeks to make is that the demand-side pressures on academics have increased 
considerably in recent years. The traditional expectations surrounding the need for research grant 
applications to demonstrate originality, significance and rigor have now been overlaid with a set of more 
externally-facing expectations regarding social impact, relevance and public. The slight irony in terms of 
scholarly curiosity is that academics are increasingly expected to present a very clear narrative, or set of 
expectations about what will be achieved (‘reach’ and ‘depth’), how they will be achieved (‘pathways to impact’ 
and why it matters (‘link to recognised societal challenge’) before the research is even undertaken. It would at 
this point be possible to highlight the perceived tension between ‘blue-skies’, ‘discovery’ or ‘pure’ research, 
on the one hand, and ‘applied’, ‘goal orientated’ or ‘mission-driven’ research, on the other, but to do so 
would be to slip back towards Crow’s dependence on binary distinctions and zero-sum games which, as Sir 
Paul Nurse has underlined, are rarely ‘completely distinct’ (2015, 5). The main points being made in this 
sub-section are: (1) academics are arguably under increased pressure to make exaggerated claims about what 
their research might or has achieved; (2) those academics who lean against this pressure and make their case 
in a more modest but arguably honest manner risk rejection; and (3) the politics and management of 
expectations is a particular but rarely acknowledged challenge for collaborative scholars due to the manner 
in which they must persuade external actors (communities, charities, communities, service providers, etc.) 
to actually collaborate with them in the first place, and then to sustain that engagement. In this context ‘the 
use of exaggeration as a rhetorical device to make the case’, as Crow suggests, could be significant in terms 
of creating a sense of belief or value in a research project. This could create tensions as the project unfolds 
but I cannot help but wonder if the changing funding and audit framework within academe is almost 
demanding that researchers engage in the sort of exaggerated over-statement that Crow cautions against 
(for a discussion see Thomas, 2018). How academics cope with the emotional pressures of either accepting 
or going against this pressure leads to a focus on the emotional dynamics of modern academic life.  
 
 
Tale 3: The Danger of Being Within: The Emotional Dynamics of Modern Academic Life 
 
Although rarely discussed, it is actually far easier to craft an argument about the link between the politics 
and management of expectations (the topic of the previous sub-section) and the changing emotional 
dynamics of modern academic life than might have been expected. The work of Jennifer Chubb, Richard 
Watermeyer and Paul Wakeling, for example, on ‘Fear and Loathing in the Academy’ (2017) explores the 
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complexity of the varying moral dispositions, experiences and heightened emotionalism experienced by 
academics as they seek to navigate an increasingly pressurised and uncertain professional sector. The 
emergence of an ‘impact agenda’ in many advanced liberal democracies (for a review see Bandola Gill, 
Flinders and Anderson, 2019) is very often perceived by academics as the latest phase of the imposition of 
a neo-liberal market-based culture within higher education with negative effects for traditional notions of 
professional autonomy and intellectual freedom (see Wilsdon et al. 2019). As such, the emotional state of 
academic labour is frequently set against ‘crisis accounts’ that are said to make it increasingly difficult for 
scholars to distil a ‘true’ sense of academic identity.  
 
Words such as; ‘scary’, ‘threat’, ‘nervousness’ and ‘worry’ littered the transcripts as many spoke of their 
‘frustrations’, ‘suspiciousness’ and even ‘resentment’ of the impact agenda. Participants reported feeling 
‘sad’, ‘unhappy’, ‘jealous’, ‘anxious’, ‘demoralised’, ‘disillusioned’ ‘confused’, ‘hopeless’, ‘paranoid’, 
‘vulnerable’, ‘scared’, ‘nervous’ and ‘depressed’ about the impact agenda (Chubb, Watermeyer and 
Wakeling, 2017, 561). 
 
The ‘decline of donnish dominion’ – to paraphrase the title of A. H. Halsey’s 1995 book on the British 
academic professions in the twentieth century – is a well-worn and possibly over-stated narrative but what 
is arguably under-stated is the impact that increasing professional pressures are having on the mental health 
and wellbeing of academics. It is neither possible nor necessary to engage in a detailed discussion on this 
topic apart from saying that if there is a ‘cautionary tale’ that really needs to be told about the link between 
research and emotions in the contemporary professional context then it is one concerning what Morrish 
(2019) has recently labelled ‘the epidemic of poor mental health among higher education staff’. Excessive 
workloads and workload models that under-count the time involved in completing tasks, the failure to 
include many roles and responsibilities within the definition of ‘what counts’, the emergence of ‘excellence;’ 
as the default expectation across an increasing range of work strands, the pressure and visibility associated 
with external research audit systems, the emergence of precarious employment models within higher 
education, and the existence of a short-term performance management model in many universities are all 
held to be responsible for declining levels of mental health and wellbeing. Research conducted by Paul 
Gorczynski, Denise Hill and Shanaya Rathod (2017), for example, found that 43% of academic staff 
exhibited symptoms of at least a mild mental disorder (i.e. nearly twice the prevalence of mental disorders 
compared with the general population). A 2017 RAND report – ‘Understanding Mental Health in a 
Research Environment’ - also found that higher education staff reported worse mental wellbeing than those 
in other types of employment but also found that academics were generally reluctant to disclose or discuss 
their mental health challenges to employers (with only around six per cent of academics disclosing a mental 
health condition to their employer). It would at this point be possible to develop this argument into a 
discussion of Maggie Berg and Barbara Seeber’s The Slow Professor (2016) or to engage in more existential 
debates about the manner in which academic work is by its very nature rarely completed. The basic point 
is that the emotional dynamics of modern academic life, and especially the need to promote mental health 
and wellbeing, is an area in urgent need of open conversation. However, are the emotional dynamics and 
pressures of contemporary academic life particularly pronounced for collaborative researchers? Is there a 




Tale 4: The Danger of Being Between:  Emotional Labour and Collaborative Research 
 
Crow’s article on ‘collaborative research and the emotions of overstatement’ offers ‘four cautionary tales’ 
about paying insufficient attention to history, assuming that ‘different’ is necessarily ‘better’, over-
simplifying complex issues and courting conflict that are for reasons that remain unclear laid squarely at the 
door of collaborative researchers. They are, in fact, generic and largely accepted truisms that would pertain 
to any methodological approach and if forced to identify a ‘repeat offender’ in the sense of a methodological 
tribe that had, in my opinion, frequently failed to heed these warnings it would not be to collaborative 
researchers that I would turn.  Nevertheless, generally hidden beneath the link between collaborative 
research and its inevitable emotional content there is a critical but generally under-stated issue that Crow’s 
analysis unwittingly brings to the fore: the danger of being between.  
 
 13 
What I mean by this is that collaborative scholars often exist not as ‘insiders’ or ‘outsiders’ but somewhere 
in the intersection or nexus between academe and society. This reflects both their belief in the capacity of 
social science and their commitment to supporting social change. The risk, however, is that by adopting 
this position they exist as neither-one-nor-the-other, in the sense of not being a ‘mainstream’ academic but 
also not being a ‘conventional’ social campaigner or activist. Existing between these spheres is arguably akin 
to operating in a professional hinterland. In this regard the recent work by Kate Pahl, Milton Brown, Zanib 
Rasool and Paul Ward (2020) in this journal is as insightful as it is possibly misleading. They suggest that, 
 
[C]community partners working with academics have to bear the emotional labour, by ‘standing in the gap’ 
they are having to move between community and university. We also recognise the power of community co-
writing as a form that can open-up opportunity to speak differently, outside the constraining spaces of 
academia.  
 
The focus on community partners is undoubtedly correct but I would argue that it is also the collaborative 
researchers that must have to bear a high degree of ‘emotional labour’ as they also ‘stand in the gap’ - or as 
I prefer to suggest between – society and academe. The danger of standing between or in any gap, irrespective 
of whether it is inter-sectoral or inter-disciplinary (or both), is that you are never fully accepted by any side 
and therefore face a stark choice of either bearing the emotional costs of operating in that space or ‘taking 
a side’ by committing to a specific sect, sector, tribe or discipline. Being an inter-disciplinary academic or 
being a collaborative researcher demands – as Catherine Lyall (2019) has demonstrated – not only resilience 
but the ability to craft a very distinctive research trajectory in a professional environment that while 
rhetorically promoting the mobility of people, ideas and talent struggles in reality to recognise those scholars 
who ‘stand in the gap’. Crow might respond that history is littered with scholars who have survived in this 
space, the liminal zone. To some extent Sir Bernard Crick provides an example of a scholar who certainly 
did try and operate between but who ultimately took early retirement due to a sense that many of his skills 
and contributions were no longer valued when set against an increasingly narrow definition of 
‘professionalism’. C. Wright Mills arguably provides an ever starker example of the emotional burdens 
placed on those scholars who seek to row against ‘the drift’ of dominant professional expectations. He 
certainly paid a high price for what Brewer (2005) described as his ‘outsider mentality’ and by the time he 
died at just 45 years of age he was very much an academic outcast. ‘Standing in the gap’ Pahl and her 
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